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Abstract: In the 19th Century, Francis Galton made a case for framing British policy on Africa in terms of the 
replacement of Africa’s ‘negro’ population with the ‘China man’ because the China man- had every desirable trait. 
This policy may never have materialised but today, the relationship between Africa and China has taken the form 
of expanded trade and economic relations with a huge influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China to 
African states. This paper examines this burgeoning economic relationship through the lens of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) entered into between China and African states. This paper examines some of the typical challenges 
posed by standard BITs and then examines how current China-Africa BITs have addressed those challenges.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There was a time when the thoughts of western policymakers skirted around encouraging 
the displacement of Africa’s ‘negro’ population by the ‘good-tempered, frugal, industrious, 
saving, commercially inclined, and extraordinarily prolific’ Chinese.1 Centuries later, China 
has rediscovered Africa by herself and bearing these same qualities,2 China and Chinese 
investments have made extensive foray into Africa, forming strategic partnerships with the 
countries on the continent and steadily setting itself up to become the leading player in 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the continent.3 Investment from the West may not 
necessarily have slowed, but China is increasingly making inroads into the continent, not 
only providing capital for infrastructural development4 but also bringing in its corporations, 
which carry out the infrastructural development or operate in diverse sectors of the 
economies in States as small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs).5
      *   LLB (Benin), BL (Lagos), LLM (Budapest), SJD candidate, Central European University, 
Budapest. The author is immensely grateful to Professor Tibor Tajti, for his patient and able 
mentorship and Professor Istvan Csongor Nagy for extending the invitation to participate in this 
conference. This thematic issue (Missed and new opportunities in world trade. Eds. Csongor István 
Nagy & Zoltán Víg) was published as part of the research project of the HAS-Szeged Federal Markets 
‘Momentum’ Research Group.
1 Africa for the Chinese (2017) Link 1.
2 Commenting on the comparative advantage which China has over the west, Suisheng Zhao 
points out that ‘Chinese managers and workers are not only very diligent and disciplined but also 
normally do not ask for the comfort and expenses that Western expatriates often demand….’ see Zhao 
(2014) 1036.
3 See generally, Vadi (2012) 708 (suggesting that the growing Foreign Direct Investment [FDI]
of China ‘confirms its economic rise as an active and influential player in international relations’).
4 According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the value of the contracts for 
infrastructural projects signed by Chinese firms in Africa hit US$65.2 billion in 2016. See MOFCOM, 
Business Review XXVI (2017) Link 2.
5 According to MOFCOM, the non-financial direct investment flow from Chinese enterprises 
to Africa increased 25% (by more than US$3 billion). MOFCOM, Business Review XXVI (2017) 
Link 2.
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Perceptions matter and it is interesting to see how China and its engagement with the 
continent is perceived by Africans. Many African States hold a favourable view of China, 
according to a 2015 survey of Global Attitudes by Pew Research.6 This favourable view of 
China by African States has been considered a consequence of Chinese positive engagement 
with the continent.7 In fact, it is largely believed that the motivation for China’s burgeoning 
investment in Africa is without guile and is undergirded by a mutuality of benefits that 
result from the engagement.8 Besides, China’s diverse engagements within the continent 
has warmed its way to the heart of African leaders as a strategic partner but also through 
donations, one of such being the magnificent structure which now serves as the headquarters 
of the African Union.9
It does appear that the above arguments primarily focus, on the economic benefits that 
inure to the state parties. It is also of immense importance that this blossoming economic 
relations is examined first in the context of how it measures against prior FDI on the 
continent and also in the context of Africa’s sustainable development and human rights 
concerns. Framing the Sino-African economic relations in the context of sustainable 
development and human rights demands a benchmark and the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) offers this benchmark. The choice of the BIT as a benchmark is instructive and it will 
be shown in the paper that BITs have become the chief instrument by which FDI emanating 
from capital exporting nations are protected.10 Presently, there are 35 BITs signed between 
Africa’s 54 countries with China.
The focus on China-Africa BITs is three-fold. Not too long ago, China was more of a 
recipient of foreign direct investment and during this period, the BITs entered into by China 
reflected this position and, as pointed out by scholars, these Chinese BITs provide the 
investors with little protection in practical terms.11 It also granted China as the host 
government ample flexibility for its policy direction.12 , It makes sense to see how much its 
BITs balance in favour of developmental interests of its counterparty African states 
especially with the adoption of the Chinese ‘going abroad’ policy and China’s new role as a 
major exporter of capital to many an African state.
  6 Pew Research Centre (2017) Link 3. See also, ‘Views of China and Its Increasing Influence’, 
2007 Pew Research Centre Survey (2017) Link 4 (showing that a number of Sub-Saharan African 
countries held highly favourable opinion of Chinese involvement in Africa). 
  7 Chen et al (2016) 2 (suggesting that the favourable view of China owes to the ‘positive 
impact of China’s engagement on African growth’).
  8 Dambisa Moyo, ‘Beijing, A Boon for Africa’ New York Times, June 27, 2012. (arguing that 
investment by China in Africa is given in exchange for the much-needed resources in Africa. In the 
authors words: ‘[t]o satisfy China’s population and to prevent a crisis of legitimacy for their rule, 
leaders in Beijing need to keep economic growth rates high and continue to bring hundreds of millions 
of people out of poverty. And to do so, China needs arable land, oil and minerals.’)
  9 See for instance, Erin Conway-Smith, ‘African Union’s new Chinese-built headquarters 
opens in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ Global Post (2012) Link 5 (reporting that ‘China’s state-run Xinhua 
news agency said the new AU headquarters ‘is not only a new landmark in Addis Ababa but also the 
latest landmark in the long friendship between China and Africa.’’)
10 See Part II below.
11 Axel Berger, ‘China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: Substance, Rational and 
Implications for International Investment Law Making, The Politics of International Economic Law: 
The Next Four Years’ (2008) Link 6.
12 Ofodile (2014) 156.
436 SANFORD U. MBA
Secondly, in addition to Chinese SOEs, the continent has a huge influx of private 
investments which have found African states as attractive investment destination. 
Admittedly, this attractiveness of Africa as investment destination may have been motivated 
by many factors,13 the least of which may be the existence of BITs between their host nation 
and China. Until now, there has been no reported case of dispute for which any African 
state has been held liable. However, these do not preclude the chances that disputes may 
arise in the future especially as the BITs are characteristically for long term. In addition, as 
more and more Chinese investors become aware of the rights and protections afforded them 
by the treaties, there may well be an increased reliance on the treaties in the resolution of 
investment disputes. In the light of this, it is important that African states are more 
circumspect in the (re)negotiation of BITs with China in the future to account for provisions 
that reflect the growing international consensus on the resolution of investment disputes, 
given the public interests that such disputes characteristically involve.
Thirdly, given the present engagement of China on the African continent and all the 
rhetoric of mutual benefits, it should be expected that the modus of engagement in Africa 
should be different from what the continent has known over the years – especially regarding 
standard BITs which, demonstrated a bias in favour of investment and investors, at the 
expense of developing states. In more general terms, it will be more interesting to see how 
much China has deviated from the criticisms that trailed standard North-South BITs.
China-Africa trade scholars do not agree on whether there is a discernible pattern in 
Chinese-African BITs which suggests that China is exploiting the use of BITs to pursue 
economic ends on the African continent.14 Whether this is the case is not the primary 
purpose of this paper. Instead, the paper examines the state of Chinese-African BITs and 
sees how much they have departed from the North-South BITs and the concrete terms how 
they contribute to local economic development but also importantly, sustainable 
development.
The paper briefly examines the origins of BITs in Section II and how this origin 
has influenced perceptions which are characterized in this paper as challenges of standard 
BITs. Section III builds on the criteria characterized as challenges, to see whether Chinese 
BITs have deviated from these standard BITs which were characteristic of North-South 
BITs. The China-Tanzania BIT is chosen as basis for comparison, given the sheer size of 
the BITs. It may not be representative of all the BITs negotiated between China and African 
states but at the time of publication, this agreement is the most recent. It is largely 
representative of the progressive trend in China’s bilateral engagement with African states 
and it also represents a snapshot of Chinese attitude on the core issues of sustainable 
development, in its engagement with Africa. This recent China-Tanzania BIT reflects certain 
concerns of countries of the Global South and it is argued that sustainable development and 
human right concerns now necessarily should be a part of the BIT discourse in Africa.
13 Gu (2009) 571 (the author highlights three reasons that have hitherto motivated the investment 
of Chinese firms in Africa. First is the starting up of development assistance project, the discovery of 
niches in the market culminated into investment; others were motivated by the possibility of increased 
sales and the circumvention of US and EU protective trade restriction policies; finally, some were 
motivated by the resource prospecting for onward export to China). 
14 See Kidane (2016) 175 (‘Although some of the BITs have the hallmarks of the traditional 
North-South BITs, there is no evidence that China is systematically using BITs to push purposefully a 
particular economic agenda in Africa’). For a contrary view, Ofodile (2014) 205-6 (the author 
generally treats BITs in the South-South context with skepticism, especially as most of the ‘investment 
activities implicate the natural resource sector…’)
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2. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AS FDI VEHICLE  
AND CHALLENGES IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have been recognized as the chief instrument by which 
countries outline the rules that govern the investment of their nationals in individual states.15 
A BIT is a formally concluded and ratified agreement entered into between two states, the 
essence of which is to guarantee investors from one state – a given level of treatment when 
they invest in the other state.16 Their emergence as the choice means of investment 
protection began to gain prominence following two interrelated events that dominated 
foreign investment in the 1960s and 1970s17 Firstly, capital exporting nations began to 
experience aggressive and continued attacks on the interests of their nationals abroad, 
marked by the expropriation of their interests.18 These aggressive and sustained attacks had 
begun to whittle down the influence of the Hull Rule which was hitherto a rule of customary 
international law which provided foreign investors from expropriation.19 These aggressive 
attacks resulted in great uncertainties regarding the settlement of the growing cases of 
expropriation.
Secondly, the growing cases of expropriation was further exacerbated by the process 
of decolonization which saw western nations ‘letting go’ of their colonies and as they began 
to relinquish political authority over their colonies, it was necessary to protect both their 
investments and investors, who have interests within the colonies.20, The Hull Rule had 
begun to lose its influence as former colonies began to emerge as new autonomous and 
independent states. The convergence of states around the Hull Rule was predicated on the 
role played by colonial masters in driving the state policy of their colonies. These colonies, 
as sovereign states, as well as other developing countries soon asserted themselves,21 
claiming not only the ‘right to determine how they would treat investors’, but also, ‘the 
15 Salacuse and Sullivan (2006) 67.
16 See Sheffer (2011) 484.
17 Some scholars have linked the origin of BITs to the evolution of the investment protection 
function of formal treaties known as the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, which 
came into exist Post World War 2. See for e.g. Sheffer (2011) 485.
18 These attacks came in the form of nationalization programs embarked upon by many 
‘underdeveloped’ nations. See for instance, Dias (1970) 59 (analyzing the methods, motives and 
benefits of the nationalization of foreign owned interests undertaken by the Tanzanian government).
19 Early in the 20th Century, principal nations of the world held the opinion that the investment 
of an alien was entitled to the protection of international law, so that an expropriation by the nation 
hosting the investment must be compensated promptly, adequately and effectively. This sums up the 
Hull Rule which derived its name from diplomatic exchanges between the then US Secretary of States 
Cordell Hull and the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, in respect of the seizure of properties of 
foreigners by the Mexican government between 1915 and 1940. See generally, Guzman (1998) 
644–45. 
20 Guzman (1998) 644–45.
21 Developing states took advantage of their dominance of the United Nations General Assembly 
to pass several resolutions which helped to seriously undermined the value of the Hull Rule as a rule 
of customary international law. Some of the resolutions include: resolution 1803 (XVII) on the 
‘Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources’; resolution 3171 (XXVIII) also on the ‘Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources’; resolution 3201 (S-VI) on ‘Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order’; and resolution 3281 (XXIX) being the ‘Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States’.
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standard of compensation that should apply if that treatment is sufficiently harmful.’22 
Investment protection measures became imperative when decolonization, coupled with the 
wave of nationalization hit feverish pitch. BITs, as a way around the lack of an 
internationally recognized rule for investor protection,23 increasingly began to fill this 
void.24 In essence, the BITs serve the purpose of providing stability to the investment 
environment of the host states as well as providing for an alternative to the existing legal 
regimes in the host countries which may not adequately protect FDI.25
It has however been considered a paradox, that countries of the developing world 
which so stoutly opposed the now defunct Hull Rule, as a norm of international law, 
willingly warmed up to the embrace of BITs, which offered to foreign investors, more 
protection than the Hull Rule.26 The expectation on the part of many developing countries 
was, and still is, to give ‘credibility to commitments made to investors.’27 Knowing that it 
does require some level of confidence on the part of foreign investors to invest in another 
country, the BITs serve as binding tokens of commitment to protect the investments, and 
thereby attract FDI.28 However, the foregoing discussion suggests that the circumstances of 
its original use focused on the protection of the interests of developed states in developing 
ones that play hosts to investments of the former in the latter.29
In the light of their origins, certain criticisms have been levelled against traditional 
BITs which turn on their general outlook and provisions. These criticisms, are characterized 
as challenges of standard BITs and are examined below.
A. Power Relations in Negotiation and Ratification of BITs
BITs were, usually by their nature, between a country of the developed world and one from 
the developing world and presupposed a contractual relationship between a strong and weak 
party.30 This power relation has been said to have consequences especially for the 
22 Guzman (1998) 641.
23 See for instance the opinion of the International Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company, Limited (Belgium. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 46–47 (Feb.5), lamenting the absence 
of an internationally accepted rule on foreign investment. The august court opined:
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the growth of foreign investments 
and the expansion of the international activities of corporations False and considering the way in 
which the economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the 
evolution of law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have 
crystallized on the international plane.
24 Salacuse and Sullivan (2006) 70 (‘For all practical purposes, BIT law has become the 
fundamental source of international law in the area of foreign investment.’).
25 Johnson (2010) 925 (‘Thus, BITs reduce the expected risks to FDI in two ways: first, they 
stabilize a host country’s existing investment environment; 38 and second, they provide substitutes for 
weak domestic laws and institutions that are often ill-equipped to protect FDI.’).
26 Guzman (1988) 642.
27 Wells (2005) 444.
28 Tobin and Busch, (2010) 4 (the authors reasoned that ‘the hope for BITs is that, if they boost 
investor confidence, they are likely to result in greater inflows of FDI.’).
29 See Ofodile (2014) 138 (‘BITs were specially designed by Western nations in the wake of 
decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s to protect their investors and the investment of their investors 
in developing countries.’).
30 For instance, the United States has entered into roughly about 42 BITs. None of the listed 
parties to the BITs may be categorized as developed country. For a list of US BITs, see Link 7.
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developing nations. Firstly, the developing nations negotiated and entered into the BITs 
without the requisite experience to fully understand the dangers the agreements posed to 
their national interests and how it is very much skewed to benefit the foreign investors.31 
This realization has led some countries of the developing world to commence the review of 
their BITs. One such example is South Africa. In a position paper at the end of the noughties, 
their Department of Trade and Industry pointed out the issues arising from the inexperience 
that accompanied the signing of majority of the BITs and how it has resulted in divergence 
between protection afforded under South African law and under the BITs. To this extent, the 
Department proposed closer scrutiny and review of the BITs.32 In fact, pursuant to this 
scrutiny and review, the government of South Africa as at 2013, had followed through with 
the termination of several expiring BITs, in order to protect and strengthen its investment 
regime, and also preserve its sovereign right to pursue policy objectives.33 This policy 
objectives shall be returned to in the paper.
The need to protect foreign investments from unconscionable and arbitrary interference 
by the governments of host countries cannot be discounted, especially in the light of the 
nationalizations of the 1970s. There was however a problem. The weaker position occupied 
by these developing countries may have led them to pursue FDI by competing with other 
developing countries. This engendered regulatory competition that meant loosening their 
investment regulation regime.34 Loosening investment regulation regime implied the 
acceptance of constraints with regard to the powers of these developing countries to 
undertake public interest objectives and creating a leeway for the possible abuses of human 
rights.35
Finally, although the language of the BITs presuppose that the parties enjoy reciprocal 
rights, this in reality is hardly ever of any serious consequence for the host states, given the 
unidirectional flow of investment i.e. from the developed to the developing economy. 
Developing countries hardly ever benefit from the elaborate provisions of rights and 
the ideal would therefore be to balance these rights against obligations on the part of 
the investors. However, these BITs hardly ever provided for investors’ obligations. This 
accounts for the much talked about imbalance engendered by the BITs.36
B. Lack of Flexibility to Support State Policy Objectives
BITs generally involve wide ranging commitments on the part of the host state.37 These 
commitments are couched as rights of the investors and investments of the host states. 
A cursory look at these commitments may reveal no harm. However, their effect becomes 
31 Sheffer (2011) 492.
32 South Africa Department of Trade and Industry (2009) Link 8. 
33 Leandi Kolver (2013) Link 9. Some other developing countries outside of Africa have also 
either taken steps to terminate BITs entered with several countries or have already done so. See for 
instance, Ben Bland and Shawn Donnan (2014) Link 10.
34 Chalamish (2009) 317 (suggesting that the surge of FDI to jurisdictions with low standards 
may force the loosening of regulatory standards, creating a so-called race to the bottom).
35 Human Rights Council (2017) Link 11 ‘capital importers that lacked significant market power 
felt increasingly pressured to compete with one another for investments by accepting ever-more 
expansive provisions, constraining their policy discretion to pursue legitimate public interest 
objectives.’
36 See Jeswald and Salacuse (2010) 464. 
37 Kaushal (2009) 498. 
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more glaring in the context of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) or developing countries as 
they seek to forge policies aimed at sustainable development and promoting domestic 
development strategies. The standard of treatment clause helps to appreciate the policy 
constraints which LDCs and their developing counterparts face. Typically, standard BITs 
require that the host-state afford the investors and investments of the counterparty national 
treatment. This means that the same treatment that the host state provides its nationals 
should be afforded investors from the counterparty state. For many African countries still 
grappling with developing their local industries and their small and medium scale enterprises 
(SMEs), some level of discrimination is not only desirable but imperative, in order to give 
locals a chance to compete or to help a particularly disadvantaged section of society.38 
Commenting on the invasive nature of traditional BITs, the South African Department of 
Trade and Policy pointed out that:
BITs extend far into developing countries’ policy space, imposing damaging binding 
investment rules with far-reaching consequences for sustainable development. New 
investment rules in BITs prevent developing country governments from requiring 
foreign companies to transfer technology, train local workers, or source inputs locally. 
Under such conditions, investment fails to encourage or enhance sustainable 
development.39
A breach of such provisions on national treatment may render government policies in 
this direction liable to attack by foreign investors. This realization has led developing 
countries to rethink the national treatment provision. Typical south-south BITs either do 
away with the concept of national treatment for FDI40 or provide exceptions which for 
instance, accommodate steps by host countries to empower their local industries.41
C. Issues in Dispute Resolution Between the State and Investor
Many BITs provide for the settlement of investor-state disputes through the use of 
arbitration. When BITs provide for investor-state arbitration, it affords private investors 
from the state parties to the BIT to seek remedy for injuries they purportedly suffer, arising 
from the acts of the host state that are in breach of the substantive provisions of the BIT.42 
The acts of the hoststate which ground the remedy sought may be of general application or 
may be specifically designed to promote a public policy goal of the host state. The foregoing 
has led to challenges to the way disputes between the host state and investors are resolved. 
Some of these problems are highlighted below.
38 Salgado (2006) 1040 ‘As drafted, the national treatment provision does not recognize a state’s 
right to grant preferential treatment or reward its citizenry as a means of furthering legitimate policy 
objectives, such as environmental protection, employment stability, and infant industry development, 
just to name a few.’
39 See South African Department of Trade and Industry (2017) Link 8.
40 See for instance, the Egypt-Zambia BIT (2017) Link 12.
41 See for instance, Article 2(4) Nigeria-Egypt BIT (2000) Link 13. (It provides that: 
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, either Contracting Party 
may grant within the framework of its development policy to its own nationals and companies special 
incentives in order to stimulate the creation of local industries, provided that they do not significantly 
affect the investment and activities of nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party.’) 
42 VanDuzer (2007) 684.
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1. Arbitration as Means of Dispute Resolution
BITs typically relied on international arbitration as a means of settling disputes which arose 
from investment. As a result, local courts were bypassed and international arbitration 
tribunals were vested with jurisdiction over the disputes. The worry for developing states 
stemmed from the tendency of large multinationals to pursue the settlement of disputes 
through the international arbitration tribunals provided for in the BITs, to the detriment of 
economy of the host states and the capacity of the host states to provide public goods for 
their citizens. A vast number of investor-state dispute claims are initiated annually.43 
The costs and awards against host-states, as well as the use of the dispute settlement 
mechanism provided for in the BITs to challenge the provision of public goods by host 
states have been particularly troubling for developing countries. As a result, states are 
beginning to reconsider the inclusion of investor-state disputes resolution in the form of 
international arbitration in the negotiation of BITs.44
2.  Lack of Transparency and Openness to Third Party Participation  
in Dispute Resolution
In the light of the public interest dimension of investor-state disputes, the case has been 
made for an increased public access to the dispute resolution process,45 as it will ‘ensure 
public acceptance of the result and the democratic accountability of the process.’46 The lack 
of transparency or participation by third parties to the BITs stems from the nature of 
international commercial arbitration, on which investment-state arbitrations are originally 
modelled. A key advantage touted in favour of international commercial arbitration is 
confidentiality. This confidentiality does not generally sit well with the interests of state 
parties, who beyond the commerciality of the transaction still have to cater to a broad range 
of public policy issues as well as the judicious allocation of tax payers’ monies. 47
The International Centre for The Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) and the 
United Nations Commission on Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have taken steps towards 
ensuring transparency. In the case of ICSID for instance, information which includes the 
names of the parties, the subject matter of the dispute, and the names of the arbitrators are 
now accessible to the public. However, more substantial information such as the argument 
43 Between 2011 to 2016, an average of 61 cases were initiated through the International Centre 
for The Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID). ICSID (2017) Link 14.
44 For instance, in 2016, the South African President signed into law, the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment Act, 2015 (2017) Link 15. The Act in sum prescribes the use of mediation, 
and then the use of the domestic legal process in investment dispute resolution. Although the state 
may accede to arbitration, this follows after the exhaustion of domestic remedies and is between 
states. The Act is publicly available.
45 One author has rhetorically questioned whether ‘the far-reaching penetration of foreign 
investment guarantees into areas of national regulation of public interests should not be 
counterbalanced by corresponding opportunities for access to justice and the availability of remedies 
for civil society in the host State of foreign investments.’ Francioni (2009) 729–47 (abstract).
46 VanDuzer (2007) at 685.
47 See for instance, Seznec (2004) 211 (‘The extent to which transactions are not to be treated as 
ordinary commercial transactions but as important matters of public policy and national sovereignty 
cripples the international dispute resolution system as a whole because the underlying interests of the 
parties are so fundamentally different.’) 
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of the parties, the minutes and records of proceedings are not accessible.48 The parties may 
agree to the confidentiality of the final award of the tribunal, in addition to the inaccessibility 
of the arbitration proceedings to the public, unless the parties before the tribunal agree 
otherwise.49
The UNCITRAL Rules and Convention on Transparency50 have now gone a step 
further to do more towards providing for access and transparency in the process of investor-
state arbitration.51 The challenge however posed by the Rules is that it does not apply to the 
investment treaties which came into effect prior to 1 April 2014, the effective date of the 
Rules, unless the parties to the investment treaty agree to its applicability. The challenge is 
made significant with the realization that there already exist over 3000 investment treaties 
which will require the parties to agree on the applicability of the Rules to disputes arising 
from the treaties. Although the Mauritius Convention on Transparency has been adopted, 
providing the possibility for the application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rule to 
arbitration commenced under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or other rules of arbitration, 
there is still the possibility for parties to the Convention, to make reservations or exclude 
treaties from the purview of the Convention.52 To avoid undercutting the transparency drive, 
it has been argued that the default rule of investment arbitration be changed from 
confidentiality to transparency.53 A futuristic argument can be made to the effect that states 
contemplating signing BITs may expressly provide for transparency in the arbitration 
clause of their dispute settlement provision. This takes care of any transparency worries 
ab initio.
3. CHINESE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES –  
ANOTHER SLIPPERY SLOPE FOR AFRICA?
Understanding the current trend of Chinese investment in Africa is important. Colonialism 
and the attendant exploitation of the natural resources of countries in Africa, amongst other 
factors, have been blamed for the weak institutions in many states in Africa as well as the 
persistent underdevelopment of the continent.54 Chinese investment in Africa is often in 
the nature of natural resource extraction and has informed the cautionary tale of some form 
of neo-colonialism and its capacity to continue to further underdevelopment on the 
48 Sheffer (2011) 494–95.
49 Sheffer (2011) 494–95 (author argues further that ICSID stakeholders have opposed steps 
towards greater transparency in ICSID).
50 The Rules were adopted on 16 December 2013 and came into effect on 1 April 2014. See 
generally UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (2017) Link 16.
51 These measures include the public availability of parties to the dispute, the economic sector 
involved, and the treaty on which the claim is based; public access to hearings and; third party and 
non-disputing party submissions to the tribunal. 
52 See generally, Article 3 of the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration (2107) 17.
53 See Billiet (2016) 46. 
54 See for instance Nunn (2007) 157–75 (developed a model to explain why colonial rule 
contributed to underdevelopment in Africa and even though it has ended, it continues to matter in 
Africa’s underdevelopment).
Acemoglu et al, (2001) 1369–1401 (showing that in previous colonies where the policy of the colonial 
masters was focused on resource extraction, weak private property institutions were established and 
such institutions continued even after independence). 
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continent.55 Furthermore, like the case with most of the developed nations of the global 
North, investment, in most cases, is, unidirectional, so that the benefits that the protections 
afforded by BITs still favour the capital exporting country. Against this background, the 
Chinese BIT with Tanzania is examined, to see if, and how it has deviated from the standard 
BIT.
The China-Tanzania BIT is not a template of all other existing BITs between African 
states and China but, being the latest BIT with an African state, it may well represent the 
evolved approach of China in its BIT engagement with African states.
A. Flexibility in Standards of Treatment
If African ‘owned’ businesses will ever have a chance of survival or growth, it is imperative 
that the BITs negotiated between African states and China allows for flexibility around 
certain core provisions that feature prominently in the BITs. It cannot be denied that the 
business terrain in many an African state could be incredibly difficult given the lack of both 
physical and legal infrastructure. The Chinese have shown grit in weathering the terrain.56 
Consequently, a national treatment provision for instance, may prove to be detrimental to 
the interest of local businesses. This provision like in many BITs between China and 
African states feature in the China-Tanzania BIT. The China-Tanzania BIT does however 
accommodate flexibility in respect of its national treatment provision by subjecting national 
treatment to the national laws and regulations of the host-state, relating to the ‘operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, sale or disposition of the investment’ within the 
host-state.57
With the above provision, it may be difficult to fit into these criteria, policy objectives 
of the host state that seeks to bolster local industries, and provide a chance against the very 
competitive Chinese businesses. Hence, the BIT provides that pursuant to national laws and 
regulations, the contracting parties are at liberty to
… grant incentives or preferences to its nationals for the purpose of developing and 
stimulating local entrepreneurship provided that such measures shall not significantly 
affect the investments and activities of the investors of the other Contracting Party.58
This provision very much mirrors south-south BIT provision on national treatment. 
This provision ensures the flexibility of the host-state in driving policy relating to local 
55 Reuters (2011) Link 18; see also Lamido Sanusi (2013) Link 19 (the author, a former 
Governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank opined as follows: ‘[s]o China takes our primary goods and sells 
us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India 
to secure raw materials and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new form of 
imperialism.’)
56 See Gu (2009) 578 (‘When asked about their perception of the investment climate in Africa 
in general, there is even a saying among the Chinese investors that “Despite the strong wind and wild 
waves, the deepwater still has fish to be found.”)
57 Article 3(1) of the China-Tanzania BIT provides that ‘[w]ithout prejudice to its applicable 
laws and regulations, with respect to the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, sale 
or disposition of the investments in its territory, each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the 
other Contracting Party and their associated investments treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to its own investors and associated investments in like circumstances.’
58 Article 3(2) China-Tanzania BIT.
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businesses and also balances protection for investors and investment of capital exporting 
state. While a significant impairment of the investors and investment of the capital exporting 
state is not expressly defined, it may well be determined on a case by case basis depending 
on the industry; the effect on returns on capital invested; and whether the investor has been 
apprised of the policy of the host-state to incentivize or prefer its local industries at the 
point of admitting the investment.
B. Dispute Resolution in the China-Tanzania BIT
Interestingly, China as a host-state for FDI notably did not elaborately provide for 
investorstate dispute resolution, or where such provisions existed, they were very much 
limited.59 More directly, in order to protect China as a host state, the BITs had provisions 
which allowed China the right to agree on the resolution of disputes on the basis of each 
individual case. The China-Tanzania BIT does reflect this form of protection too. The BIT 
first advocates recourse to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods for the resolution 
of investor-state disputes. When the ADR procedure cannot resolve the conflict between the 
parties, the investor may then initiate formal dispute settlement procedures 6 months from 
the initiation of ADR.60 Given this provision under the BIT, it is clear that ADR must 
necessarily precede the commencement of formal settlement of investor-state dispute. This 
may be regarded as an improvement for those Global South countries who are particularly 
concerned about the immediate recourse to arbitration. This period may help the investor 
and state reach an amicable resolution of the dispute.
After the 6-month period, the investor may pursue domestic litigation, arbitration 
submitted to ICSID under the Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States; or under the arbitration rules of UNCITRAL; or to any other 
institutional or ad hoc tribunal agreed upon by the disputing parties.
There is no mention of transparency and accessibility of the arbitration procedure by 
interested third parties in the BIT. Although ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules (recognized in 
the BIT) have taken steps to ensure transparency and accessibility, the inherent limitations 
of these steps still pose some already identified challenges. It will therefore be important 
that clear and unambiguous provision is made for transparency and access, especially by 
relevant interest groups where investor-state disputes are to be resolved by arbitration. In 
the African context where it is not altogether impossible for collusion between government 
officials and (not necessarily foreign) investors, transparency and public access through the 
participation of non-governmental organizations and advocacy groups can play a critical 
role, by offering perspectives to investment disputes that may possibly arise, which neither 
the state nor the investors may avert their minds.61
C. Promotion of Sustainable Development in Host States
It has been already mentioned that part of the drive for Chinese investment in Africa is due 
to the natural resources required by China’s resource-intensive growth model.62 In addition, 
China is engaged in a flurry of infrastructural development projects and Chinese companies 
are setting up businesses in different parts of the continent. This has come with continuing 
59 Article 3(2) China-Tanzania BIT.
60 Article 13(1) and (2) China-Tanzania BIT.
61 VanDuzer (2007) 685.
62 Dollar (2016) xiii.
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environmental63 and social costs.64 A concrete approach to ensuring sustainable development 
is still lacking despite the China-Tanzania BIT meeting several of the concerns expressed 
by countries of the Global South in respect of standard BITs.
The China-Tanzania BIT sets out the objectives of promoting ‘healthy, stable and 
sustainable economic development and to improve the standard of living of nationals’65 but 
there are no substantive provisions in the treaty which are directed towards the attainment 
of these objectives.66 The closest the BIT comes to addressing possible sustainability 
concerns is in respect of reasonable measures taken by the host state in the interest of 
sustainable development concerns.67 This is not very helpful as it only deals with cases 
where expropriation is in issue, without the imposition of any direct and active duty on the 
investor to incorporate sustainability in its investment.
China and many other Asian countries once had the reputation of providing 
manufacturers with cheap labor. However, the rising Chinese labor costs may mean that 
Africa is the next manufacturing frontier,68 given its favourable tariffs and the accessibility 
to the EU and US markets.69 It becomes very important that the BITs protect as much as 
possible, labor rights, environmental rights and many other considerations which will 
ensure that African economies do not isolate sustainability in their growth trajectory. Now, 
given that host states in Africa may not necessarily have an adequate protection or 
enforcement regime, obligating Chinese investors to undertake social and environmental 
assessment before undertaking projects may be a starting point.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the bourgeoning interest of China on the African continent. This 
relationship as the paper points out has seen huge capital and infrastructural investment on 
the continent, both by Chinese SOEs as well as private investors in the form of SMEs. The 
paper narrowed down its examination of the growing relationship to the BITs between 
African states and China. The aim was to see how these BITs may have evolved, in the light 
of several misgivings expressed by countries of the Global South against standard BITs, 
often negotiated between these countries and developed ones. Using the China-Tanzania 
BIT as the measuring stick, this paper admits that some of the misgivings have been dealt 
63 See for instance, Tife Owolabi (2016) Link 20.
64 See for instance, Amnesty International (2017) Link 21.
65 See preamble to China-Tanzania BIT.
66 Kidane (2016) 164.
67 Article 6(3) of the China-Tanzania BIT provides that:
Except in rare circumstances, such as where the measures adopted substantially exceed the measures 
necessary for maintaining reasonable public welfare, legitimate regulatory measures adopted by one 
Contracting Party for the purpose of protecting public health, safety and the environment, and that are 
for the public welfare and are non-discriminatory, do not constitute indirect expropriation.
68 See for instance, WitsJournalism (2017) Link 22.
69 See for instance the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Title I, Trade and 
Development Act of 2000; P.L. 106–200). The Act removes barriers and other obstacles to trade 
between the sub-Saharan Africa and the US and generally enhances trade preferences in favour of the 
former. The AGOA (2000) Link 23. There is also the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
negotiated between the EU and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The aim of the 
EPAs the is to promote trade and thereby engender sustainable development and the alleviation of 
poverty. 
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with and it has made a case for strengthening sustainable development considerations in the 
BITs. Previous engagement with developed countries and the social and environmental 
impacts of such engagements serve as a cautionary tale for Chinese investment in Africa, 
especially given the sectors where they operate. Accommodating sustainable development 
in future BITs, it is believed, will provide some balance, so that whilst protecting investors, 
host African states attain meaningful development.
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